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ORE than adecade has passed since the demise
of the Bretton Woods system offixed exchange rates.1
Because ofits demonstratedinability to provide forthe
institutional adjustment of exchange rates necessary to
incorporate change, there is general agreement that
the Bretton Woods system, under which world trade
was organized from 1945 to 1971, could not havebeen
maintained.2 Moreover, the viability of the system of
floating exchange rates is buttressed by bothamassive
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Since 1973—74 every country has faced the choice of whether to
allow its currency to float: most countries have chosen not to float
freely:
Ofthe 146 countries comprising the membership
0
fthe International
Monetary Fund, 37 peg their currency to the U.s. Dollar, 13 to the
exchange rate of the French Franc, 14 to SDRs. 24 to some other
composite unit, and 5 to some other currency. Eight countries, the
member, of the European Monetary System, peg their currencies to
the European Currency vnit and to eachother while floating freely
against other currencies. Thirty-seven countries have miscellaneous
arrangements. Only eight countries, (including the United States)
permit their individual currencies to float freely.
International Letter, Federal Reserve Bank ofChicago (May 20,
1983), p. 1. This result neither refutes the advantages offloating
rates norsurprises floating—rateadvocates. Both Milton F’riedsnast,
in Milton Friedman and Rohert V. Roosa, The Balance of Pay-
inents: Free Versus Fixed Exchange Rates (American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1967), p. 121, and Ham’ C.
Johnson, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969,” this Re-
view (June 1969),, pp. 12—24, have noted that a fixed rate has
advantages for small open economies assd that closely knit trading
partners would findajoint float preferable. Moreover, theyargued
that only the mostimportant currencies (tlse dollar, the mark and
the yen) have to be market determined for the advantages of
floating rates to accrtse.
2
For examples, see Leif II. Olsess, “The Nostalgia for Bretton
Woods,” Wall StreetJournal, May25, 1983;Irwin L. Kellner. The
Manufacturers Hanover Economic Report (May 1983); and David
R. Frasscis, “Why World Bankers Look Askance al Returning to
Fixed ExchangeRates,” Christian Science Monitor, May24, 1983.
body of theoretical support and a continuing emer-
gence of institutions that facilitate international trade
under such a system.3
Despite the theoretical arguments and historical
evidence supporting the benefits of floating exchange
rates, there have been many calls for a return to fixed
exchange rates.4 The criticisms of floating exchange
rates have emanated from a variety of spokesmen —
businessmen, politicians and columnists — and have
led to media discussions that blame floating exchange
rates for a wide variety ofeconomic ills, both domestic
and international. When carefully considered, how-
ever, most criticisms of floating exchange rates share
some common misinterpretations ofinternational data
or misunderstandings of exchange rate determination.
Rather than confronting the broad issue of whether
floating or fixed exchange rates are preferable, we
choose to examine five common myths about floating
exchange rates that have received considerable sup-
port in the financial and general press. Since these
3
For examples, see Milton Friedman, ‘The Case for Flexihle Ex-
change Rates,” in his Essays in Positive Economics (University of
Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 157—203; Johnson, “The Case for Flexi-
ble Exchange Rates, 1969”; Johan Myhrman, “Experiences of
Flexible Exchange Rates is) Earlier Periods: Theories, Evidence,
and a New View,” ScandinavianJournal ofEconomics V. 78, No.2
(1976), pp. 169—96; and Roy A. Batchelor and Geoffrey E. Wood,
“Floating Exchange Rates: The Lessons of Experience,” in Batch-
elor and Wood, eds., Exchange Rate Policy (St. Martin’s Press,
1982), pp. 12—34.
1
The best known among these is President Francois Mitterrand of
France who, addressing a recent meeting ofthe Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development in New York City, said:
“The time has come to thinkofa new Bretton Woods... Otitsidc
this proposition, there will be no salvation.” “Mitterrand Seeks
Parley to Revamp Monetary System,’ New York Tinses, May
10, 1983.
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misconceptions frequently are basedon a faulty under-
standing ofexchange rate determination, we first out-
line the elements of the modern asset market view of
exchange rates.
ELEMENTS OF EXCHANGE RATE
DETERMINATION5
An exchange rate is simply the relative price oftwo
assets — one country’s currency in terms ofanother’s
— which is determined in relatively efficient markets
in the same manner as are the prices of other assets,
such as stocks, bonds orrealestate. Unlikethe pricesof
services or nondurable goods, asset prices are in-
fluenced comparatively little by current events. Thus,
for example, daily fluctuations inthe flowofbuyers to a
farmers’ market have a great impact on the prices of
vegetablessold therebut almost no impact on theprice
of the farms producing those vegetables; instead,
longer-term expectations of demands and supplies of
vegetables govern the farms’ values. Similarly, the
values of national currencies do not rise or fall with
contemporaneous exports or imports ofgoods andser-
vices but rather with the long-term expectations of
their countries’ economic prospects.
Given the dominance of this long-term perspective
in exchange ratedetermination, several characteristics
of the modern theory of asset pricedetermination are
of both theoretical and empirical relevance. First,
asset price movements are irregular and unpredict-
able; that is, they behave as a random walk in the short
run. Since the current price already reflects the ex-
pected future value ofassets, this observed unpredict-
ability can reflect only unexpected events or “news. “~
asset market viewofexchange ratedetermination sketched in
this section follows that ofMichael Mussa, “Empirical Regularities
in the Behavior of Exchange Rates as~dTheories of Foreign Ex-
change Markets,” in Karl Bmusiner assd Allan H. Meltxer, eds,,
Policiesfor Employment, Prices, and Exchange Rates, Carnegie-
Rochester Cosiference Series on Public Policy (supplement to the
Journal ofMonetary Economics, Volume 11, 1979), pp. 9—57. It is
the predominant view of most intertsational economists due to its
ability to explainmany oftheempirical regularities inthe behavior
ofexchange rates that have been exhibited throughout our experi-
ence with floating exchange rates. See also Jacob Frenkel, “Flexi-
ble Exchange Rates, Prices, and the Role of‘News’: Lessons from
the 1970s,”Journal of Political Economy (August 1981), pp. 665—
705. It should be noted, at the outset, that we do not intend to
present a complete theory of exchange rate determination,nor
even extend tlse stateofthecurrent theory. Instead, we will follow
up this sketch of accepted theory with what we consider to he
widelyheld misconceptions concerning both the determination of
exchange rates and the consequences of exchange rate changes,
and then demonstrate how these misconceptions are inconsistent
with both the data and generally accepted economic theory.
t
See Frenkel,”Flexible Exchange Rates, Prices, and the Role of
‘News’.”
Second, exchange rates reflect anticipated relative
inflation rates that are generated by both past and
expected future monetary and fiscal policies of the
countries whose currencies arevalued in the exchange
rate. Therefore, currencies ofcountries with relatively
lower expected inflation rates are cheaper to holdover
time and are in greater demandat the same pricethan
those with higher expected inflation rates, Conse-
quently, higher-inflationcurrencies will tend todepre-
ciate relative to lower-inflation currencies.
Third, in thelongrun, exchangerates move tomain-
tain purchasing power parity (PPP) among the various
countries; PPP means that a dollar’s worth ofthe for-
eign currency (at the current exchange rate) will buy
the same amount ofgoods in the foreign country as a
dollar will buy in the United States. Ifso, the ratio of
the U.S. price level to that of the foreign country will
equal the exchange rate. Nonetheless, due tointerest
rate movements, among other things, short-run depar-
tures from this condition are observed frequently.
Also, over long periods, relative scarcities and labor
productivities in different countries may change at
different rates, altering the equilibrium absolute PPP.
Therefore, a somewhat weaker form ofthis condition,
relativepurchasing power parity(RPPP), which asserts
that changes in the exchange rate will equal changes in
the ratio of U.S. to foreign price levels, is a more
reliable, but not infallible, short-run guide.
Fourth, paralleling PPP is acondition calledinterest
rate parity (IRP). IRP means that the real yield — net
of expected inflation and expected exchange rate
changes — obtained by investing in securities in any
given currency will be roughly equal to the yield
obtained from securities in any other currency. For
example, IRP implies that a German investor would
expect to obtain the same return from buying a short-
term Bundesbank security and then selling it three
months later as he could alternatively obtain from sell-
ing deutsche marks (DMs) to get dollars, using the
dollars to buy a U.S. Treasury bill, selling it three
months laterand then using the dollar proceeds to buy
DMs. Other things equal, ifthe real yield in Germany
rises relative to that in the United States, the dollar
would depreciate.
Each ofthese four elements ofexchange rate deter-
mination operates simultaneously so that exchange
rate movements can seldom, ifever, be attributed to a
single cause. Conversely, all of these elements can be
understoodto result from the aggressiveinteractions of
well-informed, profit-seeking traders transacting in
well-organized, international currency markets. Any
trader who by his possession ofsome new information
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sees an opportunity for profit will make transactions
which will tend to move exchange ratesboth to reflect
that new information and to foreclose the opportunity
for further profit. This tendency for market prices of
assets, such as exchange rates, to reflect quickly all
relevant new information is the primary characteristic
ofan “efficient market.” Thisefficient marketproperty
will be useful in examining the five common myths
about floating exchange rates.
MYTH 1: FLOATING EXCHANGE
RATES HINDER INTERNATIONAL
TRADE -
Proponents ofa return to fixed exchange rates argue
that since exchange rate fluctuations are obviously
larger in a floating rate system, there is more uncer-
tainty associated with international trade in such a
system. Consequently, they contend that floating ex-
change rates raise more impediments to international
trade than would exist if exchange rates were fixed.7
A floating exchange rate is one whose equilibrium
value is determined by market forces, not by the in-
tervention ofmonetary authorities in foreign exchange
markets.8 As previously outlined, the factors that in-
fluence exchange rates are not only those factors that
reflect current conditions of demand and supply in
foreign exchange markets, but also market partici-
pants’ expectations about those conditions in the fu-
ture. Increases (or decreases) in exchange rates, there-
fore, are responses to changes in both current market
forces and expectations of future marketconditions —
changes that will occur regardless of the type of ex-
change rate system.
7
For example: “There is broad agreement that exchange rates play
an important role in the international adjustment process.
However, in thejudgment ofsome countries, exchange rates have
deviated at times strongly in theshort- and medium-term fromthe
rates that appeared to be warranted by fundamental determinants
such as price or current-account developments. In addition, it is
widely felt that excessive short- and medium-term exchange rate
variability has adverse consequences for domestic economic de-
velopments and the workingof the international adjustment pro-
cess,” excerpted from the introduction to theReport ofthe Work-
ing Group on Exchange Market Intervention, established at the
Versailles Summit of the Heads ofState and Government (March
1983). See also, Otmar Emminger, “All Nations Need An Ex-
change Rate Policy,” New York Journal of Commerce, October 5,
1981; Jack Kemp, “A Floating Dollar Costs Us Jobs,” Washington
Post, May 15, 1983; and Richard W. Rahn, “It Is Time for a New
lssternational Monetary Conference,” Economic Outlook, Cham-
ber of Commerce ofthe United States, June 28, 1983.
5
For a discussion ofhow official intervention may affect the ex-
change rate, see Dallas S. BattenandJamesE. Kamphoefner, ‘The
Strong U.S. Dollar: A Dilemma for Foreign Monetary Author-
ities,” this Review (AugustlSeptember 1982), pp. 3—12.
Conversely, afixedexchange rate isone whosevalue
is maintained bythe monetaryauthority through varia-
tions in monetary policy. The appearance ofless price
uncertainty under fixed exchange rates is obtained at
the cost of greater policy uncertainty. The mainte-
nance offixed ratesimplies followingpolicies (especial-
ly monetary) that produce fixed rates. In particular, for
an exchange rate to be maintained at a given level,
inflation rates and real interest rates in the two coun-
tries cannot diverge; or, inother words, the twocoun-
tries must follow monetary policies that result in such
similarities. Any upward or downward pressure on the
exchange rate, then, must be countered by appropri-
ate policy changes.. This uncertainty associated with
potentially frequent and unpredictable policy changes
in a system offixed rates is not present in a system of
floating rates. Thus, theappearance ofless uncertainty
with fixed exchange rates is an illusion. Consequently,
the shift from a fixed to a floating exchange rate system
should not have a significant negative impact on inter-
national trade.
One way of investigating whether or not floating
exchange rates have had a negative impact on interna-
tional trade is to examine the value of total trade (ex-
ports plus imports) as a percentage of nominal GNP
over time; this is presented in chart 1 for the United
States and five other major industrial countries. It is
clear from this chart that since March 1973 (the date
generally accepted asthe beginning ofthe floating-rate
period), there has been no decline in the ratio oftrade
to GNP. In fact, there is a marked increase inthe trend
ofthis ratio for some countries during the floating-rate
period.0 More rigorous investigations have supported
this casual analysis by failing to find any significant
negative impact offloating exchange rates on interna-
tional trade.’°
~Thetrendgrowth rate ofthe ratioof trade to GNP in the floating-
rate period is significantly larger in a statistical sense than that in
the fixed-rate period for Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and
the United States.
t0
See Peter Hooper and Steven W. Kohlhagen, “The Effect of
Exchange Rate Uncertainty on the Prices and Volume ofInterna-
tional Trade,” Journal of International Economics (November
1978), pp. 483—511; Bela Ralassa, “Flexible Exchange Rates and
International Trade,” in John S. Chipmau and Charles P. Kind-
leberger, eds., Flexible Exchange Ratesand the Balance of Pay-
ments(North-Holland Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 67—SO; Richard
N. Cooper, “FlexibleExchange Rates, 1973—1980: HowBad Have
They Really Been?” in Richard Cooper, and others, eds., The
Intenaatinal Monetary Syste.m Under Flexible Exchange Rates
(BallingerPublishingCo., 1982),pp. 3—15; andAndrew I). Crock-
ett and Morris Goldstein, “Inflation Under Fixed and Flexible
Exchange Rates,” IMF StaffPapers (November 1976), pp. 509—
44. For an analysis ofperiods other than the l
97
0s, see Leland B.
Yeager, International Monetary Relations: Theory, History, and
Policy, 2nd ed, (Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 252—77; and Myhr-
man, “Experiences of Flexible Exchange Rates in Earlier
Periods.”
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Chart!
Total Trade as a Percentage of Nominal GNP
Percent
MYTH 2; A DEPRECL4TING
CURRENCY GENERATES DOMESTIC
INFLATION,
During the period of generally floating exchange
rates in the l970s, most industrial countries experi-
enced episodes of accelerating domestic inflation and
exchange rate depreciation. These experiences have
given rise to a school ofthought that a decline in the
exchange rate induces an increasein domestic inflation
through an increase in the domestic-currency price of
imports. But, an increase in inflation is expected to
cause a further decline in the exchange rate, which
causes additional inflationand soforth. ~ This “vicious
5
See John F. 0. Bilson, “The ‘Vicious Circle’ Hypothesis,” LMF
StaffPapers (March1979), pp. 1—37; Marian E. Bond, “Exchange
circle” leaves little hope ofever obtaining price stabil-
ity in a world of floating exchange rates.
This view confuses the relationship between ex-
change rates and domestic inflation in at least two
ways. First, it implies that there isa causalrelationship
that runsfrom exchange rate changesto changes in the
rate of domestic inflation. Second, it suggests that
inflation is a cost-push phenomenon. An understand-
ing of the relationship between money growth and
Rates, Inflation, and Vicious Circles,” IMF StaffPapers (Decem-
ber 1980), pp. 679—711; Crockett and Goldstein, “Inflation Under
Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates”; Paul Lewis, “France Hits
Record Low;Sharper Quarrel Is Seen, “New York Times, May28,
1983; Robert D. formats, “Currency-Rate Lessons,” New York
Times, March 27, 1983; and Robert Solomon, The International
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inflation, however, should dispel each ofthese concep-
tual errors.
Inflation as a Monetary Phenomenon
A country’s money supply essentially is determined
by its monetary authority; the demand for money (i.e.,
an individual’s desire to hold a portion of his wealth in
the form ofmoney) is determined primarily by income,
realinterest rates, prices and price expectations in that
country. The equilibrium rate of inflation is the one at
which the growth rate ofthe money supply equals the
growth rate of individuals’ desired money holdings.
Any other inflation rate motivates individuals to alter
their spending rate in an attempt to change their
money holdings at a rate different from the rate at
which the money supply is growing.
A monetary disequilibrium, through its impact on
the rateofaggregate spending, simultaneously induces
changes inthe rate ofdomestic inflationand the foreign
exchange rate. Thatis, changes in the rateofconsumer
spending affect not only domestically produced goods
and services but also those produced abroad. Altered
demands for foreign goods and services, in ttirn, pro-
duce changes in U.S. demand for foreign currencies
arid as a consequence, changes in theforeign exchange
value of the dollar, all other things equal. Thus, the
rate ofdomestic inflation and changes in the exchange
rate are detennined jointly by the rate of domestic
money growth relative to the growth of the amount
that individuals. domestic and foreign, desire to hold.
The Cost-Push Fallacy
The cost-push explanation ofinflation is supported
neither by economic theory nor empirical evidence.’2
This non-monetary explanation of inflation suggests
that an exchange ratedepreciation raises the domestic
currency prices of imported goods and services and,
consequently, the cost of living. Wage demands, and
subsequently, wages, are presumed to rise tocompen-
sate for the increased cost of living. Higher wages
would mean higher production costs and, as a result,
producers would raise the prices oftheir commodities.
The cost of living would rise, once again initiating a
“wage-price spiral” and the viciouscircle. This spiral-
ling of wagesand prices would be exacerbated within
aninternational framework asthe exchangerate would
continue to depreciate with rising domestic prices,
generating even more inflationary pressure.
52
5ee Dallas S. Batten, “Inflation The Cost-Push Myth,” this
Review (June/July 1981), pp. 20—26.
This argument confuses a change in relative prices
with inflation. A depreciation of the foreign exchange
value of a currency does raise the domestic currency
prices ofimported goods relative to the prices of those
produced domestically. Otherthings equal, the higher
prices ofimports would cause the overall price level to
rise. Therise inimport prices, however, sets in motion
both an adjustment in the public’s moneyholdings and
in its demand for non-traded goods— that is, domesti-
cally produced goods that are not internationally
traded.
First, the relative increase in the priceof imported
goods temporarily causes a rise in the rate of inflation;
in response, the public increases the rate of growth of
its desired money balances. Ifthe rateofgrowth of the
money supply remains constant, there will not be
enough additional money availablefor a new monetary
equilibrium to he reached, given this higher rate of
inflation. Consequently, inorder to increase the i’ateof
growthoftheir money balances to the desiredrate (that
is, the equilibrium rate after the exchange rate depre-
ciation), individuals must decrease their spending rate
on goods and services, both traded and non-traded.
Second, adecreased growth rateofaggregate spend-
ing brought about by the attempt to increase money
balances causes a decline in the rate of price growth in
those sectors ofthe economy that produce non-traded
goods until the overall rateofinflation is the same as it
was before the depreciation. The rateofinflation must
decline to its original value — that which equates the
growth rate of the money supply to that of money
demand;it is, afterall, the onlyrate ofinflation that can
be stistained without a change in the rate of money
growth.
Ofcourse, this adjustmentin the rateofprice growth
in the non-traded goods sector does not occur im-
mediately. During the adjustment period, the cost of
adjusting is reflectedby a decline in the growth ofreal
output (arid by a corresponding decline in employ-
ment). If the monetary authority confuses this with a
permanent decline in the rate ofaggregate demand, it
may increase the rate of growth ofthe money supply.
This action would accommodate the impact of the cur-
rency depreciation and allow the inflation to persist.
Thatis, the cause ofthe viciouscircle has been neither
the depreciating currency nor the regime of floating
exchange rates that allows such adjustments, but
rather the accommodation by the monetary
authority. 13 Such a policy response to changes in the
l:sFor additional support, see Bilson, “The ‘Vicious Circle’
Hypothesis”; assd Bond, “Exelsange Rates, Inflation, and Vicious
Circles.”
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Chart 2
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1,7 Four.quarter growth oh the trade-weighted CS’! minus U.S. CPI growth.
relative prices oftraded and non-traded goods creates
the illusion of cost-push inflation, when in fact, the
increasedrateofinflation is generatedby the increased
rate of money growth.
MYTH 3: THE DOLLAR 15
OVERVALUED.
A variety of pundits have claimed that the dollar is
overvalued. 14 The natural question this suggests is:
UFor examples, consider: “Most of this country’s current trade
troubles — the fallingexports, the disputes over other eosintries’
trading tactics, the alleged decline of American industrial com-
petitiveness — are theresultofan overpriced dollar, liftedby high
interest rates,” “Mr. Regan’s Embarrassing Dollar,”Washington
Post, May 4, 1983; “Peter G. Peterson, Chairmast of Lehman
Brothers Kuhn Loch, agreed on the question of budget deficits
and argued that the dollar is 20 to 25 percent overvalued on a
trade-weighted basis, In a year it will be more than that.” Ripley
“With respect to what is the dollar overvalued?” In the
main, individuals who claim that the dollar is over-
valued are arguing that purchasing power parity cur-
rently does not hold.
As noted in our earlier discussion, short-run depar-
tures from PIT are common and, hence, tell us little
about the over- or undervaluation ofthe dollar. Conse-
quently, RPPP is a betterindicator ofthe dollar’s value
in the short-run. According to RPPP criterion, the
exchange rate should change roughly in accordance
with changes in inflation rate differentialsj5 To illus-
trate this relationship, the trade-weighted dollar cx-
Watson, Jr., “Two Obstacles to Economic Growth Cited,” New
York Journal of Commerce, May 3, 1983.
55
Even here, however, short-run departures will he common. See
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change rate and the trade-weighted inflation rate dif-
ferential are graphed in chart 2,t6 There is a clear
correspondence between the two series; as implied by
RPPP, changes in the trade-weighted exchange rate
have reflected changes in the trade-weighted inflation
rate differential.”
Monetary Growth and the Speed of
Exchange Rate Adjustment
Given the corrective forces brought to bear through
floatingexchange rates, it is puzzling that anycurrency
couldbe over- or undervalued persistently. Yet, in the
short-run adjustment to a monetary disequilibrium,
producers probably cannot discern immediately
whether the resulting change in aggregate demand
(spending) is permanent or merely temporary. Thus,
theyrespond initially by changing theirrate ofproduc-
tion. That is, the change in money growth results in a
deviation of real economic activity from its “normal”
rate. Only when this change in spending is recognized
as permanent will producers change their prices and
attempt to return their production to its normal rate.
Hence, the impact of the monetary disequilibrium on
output eventually vanishes, leaving only the rate of
inflationpermanently affected. These long-run adjust-
ments, however, are not realized immediately.
On the other hand, the exchange rate responds to a
monetary disequilibrium more rapidly than do the
prices of domestic commodities.18 This more rapid
adjustment occurs because the exchange rate is the
relative price of two assets and, unlike commodity
56’rhetrade-weighted exchangerate is an averageofthe valueofthe
U.S. dollar against 10 other currencies, weighted by eachcoun-
try’s tradeshare, relative to abase valueof100 in March 1973. The
countries included are Belgium, Canada, France, Cersnany, Ita-
ly, Japan, the Netherlands. Swedens, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. For a more detailed explanation, see “Index of the
Weighted-Average Exchange Value ofthe U. S. Dollar:Revision,”
Federal Reserve Bulletin (Augisst 1978), p. 700. The trade-
weighted inflation difl’erential, as usually expressed, is the differ-
ence between the rate ofgrowth ofthe U.S. CPI and the rate of
growth ofthe trade-weighted foreign CPI for the same countries
using the same weights as above, Tile trade-weighted nominal
interest rate differential which is used below is the difference
between the U.S. 3-month commercial paperrate and aweighted
average ofcomparable foreigsi interest rates for the samecountries
using the same weightsas above. The trade-weightedrealinterest
rate differential is an cx post tueasure calculated as the difference
between the trade-weighted nominal interest ratedifferential and
the same period’s trade-weighted inflation rate differential.
t7
1’hecorrelation coefficient between the trade-weighted exchange
rate and thetrade-weighted inflation differential over the 1973—S3
period was 0.780; the correlation coefficient between changes in
the two series was 0.533.
55
5ee Mussa, “Empirical Regularities,” pp. 22—24.
prices, is determined in highly organized, interna-
tionally integrated markets that quickly and efficiently
assimilate new information. Consequently, the ex-
change rate will change before commodity prices
change sufficiently to regain a domestic monetary
equilibrium.
During this adjustment period then, acurrency will
be over- or undervalued in the sense that the PPP
condition will be violated. In the long run, however,
the rate of domestic inflation generally will change
sufficiently tooffset deviations from PPP that mayhave
existed in the short run.’0
These deviations of exchange rates from PPP have
engendered support for increased official interven-
tion in foreign exchange markets.’°Since these devi-
ations may either be random fluctuations or represent
short-run disequilibria, there is no reliable method of
discerning the cause of short-run exchange rate move-
ments.21 Consequently, policy actions are inappropri-
ate and actually may exacerbate the equilibrating pro-
cess, thereby lengthening the period ofadjustment.22
Finally, the overvalued dollar myth can also be in-
terpreted as acomplaint about domestic capitalmarket
conditions that cause the dollar’s value to rise above
whatit otherwisewould be. That is, the federalbudget
deficit may cause domestic interest rates to rise invit-
ing a flow of capital to dollar-denominated assets,
t9
Even though the PPP condition has been violated frequently ins
the short run during the 1970s, there is no evidence that its
usefulness as a condition of long-run equilibrium has been miti-
gated. See Jacob A. Frenkel, “The Collapse ofPurchasing Power
Parities During the 1970s,” European Economic Review (May
1981), pp. 145—65.
‘°See,for example, Valery Giseard d’Estaing, “A Communique for
Williamsburg, “The Economist (May 21, 1983), pp. 15—18; Hel-
mat Schmidt, “The World Economy at Stake,” The Economist
(February 26, 1983), pp. 19—30; Hobart Rowes,, “Fed ChiefAsks
Action on Dollar,” Washington Post, April 19, 1.983; Paul Lewis,
“U.S. Assailed in France Over Strength of Dollar,” New York
Times, April 21, 1983; and “Exchange Rate Woes Must Be
Addressed,” Washingon Post, April 17, 1983.
“Martin Feldstein, chairman of the President’s Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, recently wrote: “l’Flhere is no way in practice to
distinguish an exchange-rate movement that is merely a random
fluctuation frosn one that is part of a fundamental shift in the
equilibrium exchange rate. Exchange-market intervention aimed
at smoothinga transitorydisturbance may in factbe a counterpro-
ductiveor futileattempt to prevent abasic shift inthe equilibriusn
exchange rate.” Martin Feldstein, “The World EconomyToday,”
The Economist (June 11, 1983), p. 48. See also Mussa, “Empirical
Regularities.”
“See Frenkel, “Flexible Exchange Rates, Prices, and the Role of
‘News’ “; and Dean Taylor, “Official Intervention in the Foreign
Exchange Market, or, Bet Against the Central Bank,”Journal of
Political Economy (April 1982), pp. 356—68.
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thereby boosting the dollar’s exchange rate.23 Of
course, this does not result irs an “overvalued” dollar.
Rather, it explainswhy itsvalue is “high”;demand for a
currency may violate PPP for a sustained period ifan
economy’s asset yields in i-cal terms are different than
those ofits tradimigpartners. As such, comnplaintsabout
an overvalued dollar are really complaints about poli-
cies causing a “high” exchange rate and should not be
considered as criticisms of the floating exchange rate
system.
%~1YTH4: A DECLINE IN U,S,
INTEREST RATES WILL CAUSE THE
EXCHANGE RATE TO FALL.
It is widely alleged that changes in U.S. market
interest rates relative to those in the rest of the world
are themajor determinants ofshort-run movements in
the foreign exchange value of the dollar.24 Yet, it is
changes in real, not nominal, interest rate differentials
that actually motivate the international movement of
financial capital and, therefore, induce changes in ex-
change rates.
The interest rates quoted in financial markets are
nominal interest rates. Each nominal interest rate can
be divided into two components: the realinterest rate
(or real yield) and a premium for expected inflation.
The real interest rate represents the payment to the
lender (in terms of the ability to consume more real
goods and services later) necessary to induce him to
forego some ofhis current consumption. The inflation
premium is the compensation for the erosion of pur-
chasing power expected to occur during the life of the
loan. The nominal interest rate is approximately the
sum of these two components.
The key to understanding the short-run impact of
relative changes in nominal interest rates on the for-
eign exchange value ofthe dollar, then, is to recall the
implications of the fourth and fifth elements of ex-
change rate determination — namely, relative pur-
chasing power parity and interest rate parity. RPPP
‘
3
Feldstein holds such a view:
“According to his analysis, thecurrent high exchange rateofthe
dollar is produced by the anticipation of huge federal budget
deficits, which in tursi cause real interest rates to go up. The real
interest rate increases boost thevalueofthe dollar, and thus cause
the larger trade deficit (as U.S. goods are marked up).
‘Inshort, budget deficits begettrade deficits, andthisrequires a
high exchange value of the dollar,’ Feldstein said.” Hobart
Rowen, “Feldstein Says U.S. Should Not Weaken Dollar,”
Washington Post, April 8, 1983. See also, “Dollar and Deficit,
both Too Strong,” New York Times, June 3, 1983.
‘
4
See, for example, John M. Leger, “Dollar’s Strength Stuns Many
Traders; More Gains by U.S., U.K. Units Predicted,” The Wall
implies that exchange rates will move to offset changes
in inflation rate differentials, Thus, as we saw in chart
2, a rise in the U.S. inflation rate relative to those of
other countries will he associated with a fall in the
exchange value of the dollar. Conversely, IRP implies
that a rise in the realinterest rate in the United States
relative to that of other countries will cause the ex-
change value of the dollar to rise. Changes in the
nominal interest ratedifferential, however, can be due
either to changes in the relative inflation outlook or in
the relative real yields between the United States and
its trading partners. Since the two components of the
nominal interest differential have opposite effects on
the exchange rate, it is not clear, a priori, whether a
change in the nominal interest rate differential will
raise or lower the exchange rate.
As shown inchart 3, thereis arough correspondence
between the trade-weighted realinterest ratedifferen-
tial and the trade-weighted exchange rate for the
United States since 1976. Periods when the exchange
rate was declining also tended to be periods when the
real interest rate differential was declining and vice
versa. Conversely, as the chart reveals, there have
been periods when the exchange value of the dollar
and the nominal interest rate differential have moved
in the same direction, but there also have been many
periods when they have moved inopposite directions.
That is, changes in the nominal interest rate differen-
tial, at times, have been dominated by changes in the
real interest rate differential but, at other times, have
been dominated by relative changes in inflationary
expectations.~° Consequently, there is no stable, pre-
dictable relationship between nominal interest rate
differentials and the exchange rate.
\IYTH 5: A DEFICIT IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MERCHANDISE
TRADI~ACCOUNT WILL CAUSE A
DEPRE.CLtTING EXCHANGE RATE.
This myth alleges that the relative value ofa coun-
try’s currency is determined primarily by the differ-
StreetJournal, June 8, 1983;“The Dollar’s Surprising Strength,”
International Finance, Clsase Manhattan Bank, September 13,
1982;“What Keeps the Dollar Mighty,” Business Week (Septem-
ber 6, 1982), p. 73; amid “Mr. Regan’s Embarrassing Dollar,”
Washington Post, May 4, 1983.
“Indeed, for this eight-year period, the correlation coefficient be-
tween the trade-weighted exchange rate and thenominal interest
rate differential was — 0.331 indicating that relative inflation ex-
pectations outweighed real yield differentials. The correlation
between the exchange rate and the real yield differential was, as
theory predicts and chart 2 shcsws, positive (0.661).
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Chart 3
Interest Rate Differentials and the Exchange Rate
ence between its exports and imports of merchan-
dise.26 Yet,currencies flowbetween countriesnot only
to finance merchandise trade, but also to finance in-
vestment (capital flows) and topay forservices. lIence,
ml’hree exaissplesofthis are: ‘‘Most economists, however, believe
that the (lollar is due for afall this year (to help correct the huge
U.S. trade deficit), whatever happens to the F.MS.” GaryYerkey,
“On 4th Anniversan’, Europe’s Money System Rejigs,” Christian
Science Monitor, March 22, 1983.
“[T]he impactofan expected weakening in the dollar later this
year [is] in response to a large and growing U.S. trade deficit,”
Lawrence Chinmeriue, Executive Summary [1,5, Macro, Chase
Econometrics, July 27, 1983, p. 2.
“Trade deficits cannot contiuue at current levels. We have to
sell as wellas buy abroad. Exportearnings mustcome muchcloser
to paying ourimport hills.” Richard I). Lammu, ‘‘The Seven Dead-
ly Economic Sins,” Christian Science Monitor, August 3, 1983.
exchange rates reflect all of these flows as well as
expectations concerning future changes in them.
The importance ofcapital inflows was discussed ear-
lier. The role of income from capital services due to
previous investments, however, almost always is over-
looked in media discussions ofexchange rates.2’ That
is, American investors (individual and corporate) re-
‘
7
Twoexceptions to this neglect are Alfred 1,. Malahre, Jr.,”,Service
Transactions Keep BalanceofTrade In Surplus Despite the Large
Deficit on Goods,” The Wall Street Journal, February 10, 1982;
assd Robert A. Feldmnass and Allen J. Proctor, “U.S. International
Trade in Services,” Federal Reserve BankofNew YnrkQuarterly
Review (Spring 1983). pp. 30—36. Moreover, the currently strong
dollar may increase U.S. foreign investment tlsat will, in turn,
cosstrihute to further rises in future investment income. See, for
exasnple, “Dollar Fever Infects the World,” Business Week (June
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Sasrces, Board øt Goverso,s of the Federat Rese,ve System, Morgan Guaranty, Wa,td Fisascia Markets, and IntersaHonal Monetary Fsnd,
Intemsati ona Fisanc’ of Stat,it, cs
:1 See footnote 6 of the text.
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Chart 4
The Balance of Payments and the Exchange Rate








ceive imseome from assets held in foreign economies;
these service exports — particularly the services ofthe
American-owned capital in foreign countries — offset
mcrchandise imports and allow the United States to
run a persistent merchandisedeficit withoutnecessari-
ly inducing a decline in the exchange rate. Thus, the
balance of trade that is relevant for anticipated ex-
change rate snovements is riotthe snerchandise trade
balance alone, hut rather the mnore inclusive current
accousst balance, which includes services and govern-
inent transfers as well.
As shown in chart 4, the current account has exhib—
itecl no apparent trend, hut rather has fluctuated
around zero during the floating rate era, 1973—83.
\Vhile the merchandise trade balance has been consis-
tently in deficit since 1976, the services balance (which
is primarily investment income) generally has offset it.
There is no apparent explanation in chart 4 fbr the
significasst rise in the trade-weighted exchange rate
since snid—1980. Consequently, a continuation of defi-
cits in U.S. mnerehandise tradenecd not cause a depre-
ciation of the U.S. exchange rate,
CONCLUSION
Exchange rates are determined by the actions of
participants in active, internationally integrated cur-
rency markets, These snarkets reflect the informnation
— the economic conditions, plans amid expectations —
assimilated h’s’ a diverse set ofparticipants. Exchasige
rates adjust quite rapidly to incorporate any new imsfor-
mation provided to these markets hut, perversely,
sonic of the economic processes that the information
describes may he protracted. For example, interna-
tionally traded goods’ prices adjust almost contempo-
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Sources, Board of Governors at the Federal Reserve System and Dcpa,tnent at Comn,erce, B neat at Fco,omic Analysis, Survey at Curren
Business.
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non-traded goods’ prices adjust more slowly. Conse-
quently, full adjustment to purchasing power parity
takes place with a lag. Indeed, this adjustment can be
counterposed by movemnents of real interest rates,
which could cause exchamsge rate snovesnents to be
quite volatile during the progression to a long-run
equilibrium.
While at any time there exists an exchange rate that
incorporates all of this information, the conflicting in-
fluences emanating from different forces — for exam-
ple purchasingpower parity versus interest rate parity
— may mislead individuals whose focus is on a single
determinant of exchange rates. Furthermore, either
misapprehension ofthe actual forces — say, nominal as
opposed to real interest rate differentials — or an
incomplete specification of the determination of ex-
change rates — a trade flow approach as opposedto an
asset market approach — will produce a fatilty under-
s’tandimsg ofwhy exchange rates move and how these
movesnents affect the domestic economy.
In this article we have examined five common myths
concerning floatingexchange rates that arise from such
incomplete understanding. Perhaps, by clarifying the
mechanism ofexchange rate determination, the temp-
tationto blame floatingexchange ratesforinternational
and domestic crises canhe counteracted.28 Itshould be
clear that floating exchange rates reflect international
economic conditions irs a somewhat predictable way;
they do not create them.
~See, for example, Kemp “A Floating Dollar Costs Us Jobs”;
iiEstaing, “A Communique for Williamsburg”; Jacques R. Artus,
Toward a More Orderly Exchange Rate System,” Finance and
Development (March 1983), pp. 10—13; Leonard Silk, “Fixed
Rates May Be Better,” New York Times, March23, 1983; Helen
Ericson, “NewMonetary Alternatives Urged,” New York Journal
of Commerce, May 25, 1983; and “A Call To Sink Floating Ex-
change Rates,” Business Week (May 16, 1983), p. 147.
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